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Abstract
The European north-south divide has been an issue of a long-standing debate. We
employ a Global VAR model for 28 developed and developing countries to examine the
interaction between the global trade imbalances and their impact within the euro-area
framework. The aim is to assess the propagation mechanisms of real shocks, focusing on
the interconnections among the north euro area and the south euro area. We incorporate
theory-based long-run over-identifying restrictions and examine the effects of (i) non-
export real output shocks, (ii) expansionary shocks and (iii) real exchange rate shocks.
An expansionary policy of the north euro area and increased competitiveness in the south
euro area could alleviate trade imbalances of the debtor euro area economies. From the
south euro area perspective, internal devaluation decreases output but at the same time,
it also reduces current account deficits. North euro area origin shocks to domestic output
exert a dominant influence in the rest of the Europe and Asia.
1 Introduction
“And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.”
— Mark 3:25 New Testament
The global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession (accompanied by the
collapse of the global trade activity1) revived questions about the adopted economic policies
and their macroeconomic implications. With the debate still open, trade imbalances have
been suggested as a contributor to the global financial crisis. An intuitive view is that current
account surpluses of emerging economies supported deficit countries which, in turn, fuelled
the risk-taking behaviour of advanced economies, thereby showing the seeds of the inter-
c© 2020. The copyright of this document resides with its authors.
It may be distributed unchanged freely in print or electronic forms.
1The global financial crisis of 2008 has been followed by an unprecedented slowdown in world trade.
In fact, imports and exports in major economies dropped more than 20% from 2008Q2 to 2009Q2 (see
https://voxeu.org/article/great-trade-collapse-what-caused-it-and-what-does-it-mean for more details). Among the
vast literature on the subject, Baldwin and Taglioni [2] trace the causes of the reduction in world trade to the
decreased world demand, while Ahn et al. [1] point out the contribution of financial factors to the phenomenon.
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national financial crisis (see Obstfeld and Rogoff [52]).2 In this context, it is important to
investigate the sources and the patterns of these disparities in the trade relationships. In the
European context, this theme is reflected in the disparities between the north and the south
euro area; the former with an export-oriented economy and the latter depending more on
domestic demand.3
On the one hand, North Euro-Area (NEA) countries such as Germany, Austria, Finland,
Netherlands and Belgium have organised coordinated market economies which are built on
institutions and policies that promote the Export-Led-Growth (ELG) policies.4 Northern
euro-zone economies tend to benefit from a high production of exported goods which leads
to increased savings and external lending. On the other, South Euro-Area (SEA) economies
like Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, rely more on increased domestic consumption as a
mechanism of economic growth. This divergence of the two growth models and the adjunct
asymmetries that emerge has been pointed as the main source of the lingering recovery in
the euro-zone (see Regan [58]). The heterogeneous economic structures led to cumulative
disparities of the euro area. Since the inception of the Economic andMonetary Union (EMU)
in 1999, SEA current account deficits (on average 4.6 % of GDP) are mirrored to the NEA
surpluses (on average 3.4 % of GDP, see Figure 1).5
The existence of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has made it difficult for
the two growth paradigms to co-exist without the formation of trade imbalances. Two com-
plementary points could explain the co-existence of these countervailing policies and the
subsequent trade imbalances in the euro area. First, the “over-optimism”in the SEA was
driving strong growth in domestic demand and an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Second, financial integration and the expectation of convergence within the euro area has
helped to finance the current account deficits in the SEA. There is a vivid discussion on
the policy front that favours an expansionary policy of the NEA through the channel of real
imports to stimulate real exports and economic recovery in the SEA and accelerate the cur-
rent account adjustment. For example, the US Treasury [62] argues that Germany’s huge
current account surplus is harmful, creating “a deflationary bias for the euro area, as well
as for the world economy”. Furthermore, Krugman [49] claimed that “The narrowing of
trade imbalances should have been symmetric, with Germany’s surpluses shrinking along
with the debtors’deficits”. What made this possible in a monetary union was the devaluation
of German Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) through the decline of Unit Labour Cost
(ULC).6 The counter-argument raised by Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon [43] suggests a menu
of policy options for the confrontation of European trade imbalances such as fiscal policies
that aim to increased government savings, internal devaluation through a reduction of unit
2Borio and Disyatat [9], by looking at gross instead of net capital flows and the silent trends in international
banking system, show that the link between the financial crisis and current account imbalances was rather weak.
3The Financial Times on the 20th of August 2018 report that “Germany is on course to have the world’s largest
current account surplus for the third year in a row a situation likely to put more international pressure on Berlin to
re-balance its economy” and “Berlin has also argued that Germany’s ageing population prefers to save significant
amounts of income rather than spending it on imported goods”, see https://www.ft.com/content/07610a3a-a492-
11e8-926a-7342fe5e173f.
4The most prominent effects of exports are increased productivity, benefits from economies of scale, greater
utilisation of resources and expanded aggregate demand. Furthermore, the export sector of the economy can create
positive externalities to the non-export sector of the economy (Feder [29]). However, a neglected factor of the
ELGH is the constructive effect of imports on growth, also known as the import-led growth hypothesis (ILGH).
5See also Figure A.1 in Appendix.
6The IMF showed that the German REER was devalued by 10-20 % while ULC fell by 16%. For more
details see https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/07/08/the-good-and-bad-in-germanys-economic-model-are-
strongly-linked.
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labor cost, increased productivity and tightening financial policies to curb credit and improve
the quality of loans.
The aim of our study is to evaluate the view that an expansionary policy from NEA
accompanied by an improvement of competitiveness of SEA could potentially accelerate
current account adjustment in euro area and alleviate the observed trade imbalances. We do
so by simulating numerous scenarios based on the Generalized Impulse Response Functions
(GIRFs) as proposed by Koop et al. [48] and developed further by Pesaran and Shin [53].
We examine the regional trade interdependencies between the NEA countries, the SEA coun-
tries, USA and the rest of the world by implementing the Global VAR (GVAR) framework
proposed by Pesaran et al. [56] and developed further by Dees et al. [26]. This approach
enables us to simultaneously assess the global nature of the macroeconomic factors and
inter-linkages of the different regions under consideration.7, 8 Note that the multi-country
dimension of the problem has been overlooked by existing studies. For example, papers
such as Chinn and Prasad [19] used panel regression where the countries included in their
analysis were treated as independent units, ignoring any dynamic or static interdependence.
This study deviates from the existing literature in two ways. First, we consider the im-
plications of the export-led growth model and impose long-run restrictions that correspond
to the distinct features of each country/region. The latter allows us to identify “equilibrium”
relationships and extract shocks that consolidate the theory.9 Second, we divide the euro
area into two different regions and assess the linkages and transmission of shocks between
the NEA and SEA, within a global framework. There is a gap in the literature concerning
trade imbalances between the northern and the southern euro area and this study attempts to
fill it. Our focus is on the spillover effects that shocks, emanating from northern and southern
euro area, have on domestic output, trade and competitiveness.
First, we evaluate the impact of a positive output shock proxied by an increase of non-
export real output shock to the NEA on the SEA macroeconomic variables.10 The aim is
to investigate the view that a growth shock in NEA can be used as a tool to eliminate trade
imbalances between NEA and SEA. Second, we investigate the effects of a positive shock
to real imports both of the NEA and the SEA. We treat import shocks as a complementary
positive demand shock, which can not be captured by output shocks due to the low values
of the intertemporal rate and the elasticity of substitution effects between domestic and for-
eign goods. In a third scenario, we simulate the response of the global economy to a real
exchange rate depreciation of the SEA. In doing so, we can assess the view that global im-
balances in general and in the euro area specifically were associated with the appreciation
of the real exchange rate in the SEA. Note that the implications of all three scenarios are
consistent with the view that expansionary policy from NEA accompanied by improvements
of competitiveness in the SEA can accelerate current account imbalances in the euro area.
The analysis is conducted using quarterly data from 1980 until the end of 2016 for a
7Applications of the GVAR methodology can be found in the areas of international financial spillovers (Galesi
and Sgherri [32]), macroeconomic modelling (Dees et al. [25]; Pesaran and Smith [55]) and assessment of the global
trade linkages and imbalances (Bussière et al. [13]; Greenwood-Nimmo et al. [38]; Bettendorf and León-Ledesma
[8]; Bettendorf [7]), among others. Pesaran [54] provides a detailed review of the empirical GVAR applications.
8Alternatives to the GVAR modelling approach are the Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR) or the Panel VAR
(PVAR) models. However, while in the former model is difficult to identify the unobserved factors, the latter
approach in certain cases becomes operational by imposing restrictions on Dynamic, Static Interdependences (DI)
and on cross-sectional heterogeneity. For further details see Pesaran [54] and Canova and Ciccarelli [14].
9Garratt et al. [33] show that, in the context of macroeconometric modelling, there is a broad consensus con-
cerning the nature of long-run restrictions.
10We assume that output shock can be either demand or supply driven.
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multi-country framework that consists of 28 developed and developing economies. The re-
sults of the GVAR model support the argument that current account adjustment in the euro-
zone should be symmetric. Although positive demand shocks, in both regions, have positive
effects on exports and investment, current accounts deteriorate or at best remain stable. How-
ever, there is evidence that a devaluation of the real effective exchange rate in the SEA leads
to an increase in exports without affecting imports. Our results support the argument that de-
mand shocks in NEA accompanied by an improvement in the competitiveness of SEA could
help the adjustment of trade imbalances within the euro-zone. Finally, we assess the global
impact of the previous shocks with a particular focus on the spillovers effects from the NEA
and SEA to the rest of the world.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the empirical literature on trade
models, imbalances and the theoretical background. Section 3 presents the GVARmodel and
section 4 contains the model specification and estimation. Section 5 discusses the empirical
results, while the last one concludes.
2 Global Trade Imbalances: A Brief Discussion of the
Literature
The variations of external positions in the major economies, particularly after the 2000s, have
set the premises for the formation of global trade imbalances. Although the latter has a wider
meaning, it is common to associate excess current account deficits/surpluses with the distor-
tions in the global financial and macroeconomic system. Global current account imbalances
can be traced historically and some of them still persist to the present (Belke and Schnabl
[5]). In this context, the persistent current account deficits of the USA and other developed
economies are accompanied with current account surpluses in China, oil-exporting countries
and many East Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand). The backdrop is similar in the case of the EMU; north-
ern euro area countries have seen a significant melioration in their external trade position
whereas southern euro area countries support their current account deficits through external
borrowing.11 This section attempts to highlight briefly the determinants of such divergence
in global trade.12
An abundance of factors is related to the rise in external imbalances; Bracke et al. [11]
separate the determinants of global imbalances into structural and cyclical. The former fac-
tors mainly focus on the impact of financial market imperfections on the magnitude and di-
rection of capital flows at a global level. Bracke et al. [11] argue that if the global imbalances
are mainly driven by structural factors, a rapid unwinding is rather unlikely to occur. Alter-
natively, cyclical or “macroeconomic policy-induced” factors have fired trade imbalances.
In particular, if economic agents question the sustainability of macroeconomic policies then
an overreaction might unfold global economic imbalances. Therefore, one of the objectives
of our analysis is to gauge the impact of cyclical factors on trade imbalances.
Bracke et al. [11] separate cyclical factors into two groups: i) those factors that have a
cyclical impact on private aggregate demand such as an increase of permanent income and
of financial wealth and ii) those factors affecting the demand of public sector. The literature
11For a better illustration of the global imbalances’ formation over the last 20 years, see also Figure A.1 in
Appendix.
12For a thorough discussion of the relevant literature on trade imbalances see Bracke et al. [11].
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concerning the first set of factors indicates that there is a positive but rather weak correlation
between private consumption and current account.13 An ample literature of the factors af-
fecting public aggregate demand focus on explaining the “twin deficit” or “twin divergence
hypothesis”.14 Most of the studies which investigate the impact of fiscal policy on current
account argue that there is a negative but moderate effect of fiscal deficit on the trade balance.
For example, Chinn and Prasad [19], Gruber and Kamin [40] and Bussière et al. [12] found
very low response of trade balance to fiscal deficit. However, Kim and Roubini [46] provide
significant evidence of a positive relationship between the fiscal deficit and trade balance
known as the “twin divergence” hypothesis. In contrast to the prediction of most theoretical
models, Kim and Roubini [46] show that a fiscal policy shock improves the current account
and depreciate the real exchange rate. They explain that a boost in government spending
will increase the real interest rate which in turn will reduce consumption and will lead to the
depreciation of the exchange rate. Note that an increase of the real interest rate will raise
savings and reduce investments. In doing so, an expansionary fiscal policy can improve the
current account.
Although the argument of Kim and Roubini [46] can explain the “twin divergence” hy-
pothesis in the US, this might not be consistent with the empirical evidence for the euro
area.15 For example, Chen et al. [18] show that the key adjustment mechanism of the euro
area debtor countries was not operating. In particular, while trade deficits in debtors required
a depreciation of the real exchange rate, the euro nominal exchange rate led to further real
appreciation which, in turn, deteriorated export performance.16, 17 Furthermore, Chen et al.
[18] point that euro area current account imbalances depict the asymmetric response of the
member countries to foreign (from a euro area perspective) trade shocks, possibly due to
variations in foreign income export elasticities. Alternatively, Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon
[43] underline the role of decreased private savings in the SEA countries as a driver for the
trade imbalance in the euro area. Utilising current account regressions, they link declined
current accounts with the financial liberalisation of the EMU that depressed saving rates and
funded less productive sectors.18 Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon [43] suggest a menu of policy
options for the confrontation of European trade imbalances such as fiscal policies that aim to
increased government savings, internal devaluation through a reduction of unit labour cost,
increase productivity and tightening financial policies to curb credit and improve the quality
of loans.19
13Note that an increase of private consumption can be driven by productivity shocks which increase permanent
income and by a rise of financial wealth as reflected by an increase of assets prices. Glick and Rogoff [36] show
that a 1% increase in productivity in the US decrease the current account by 0.15%. Furthermore, Bussière et al.
[12] have shown that a 10% increase in equity wealth in the US could deteriorate the trade balance by 1%.
14The ”twin deficit“ argument postulates that the fiscal deficit is the main force that generates current account
deficit.
15The majority of the literature has focused on the imbalances originating from the U.S. and the relationship
between U.S. external position and Asian surpluses. Interestingly, some studies attempt to assess the intra-eurozone
imbalances and the structural gaps between core euro-zone economies and the periphery.
16Chen et al. [18] document that while the relative price movement within the euro-zone contributes to the
appreciation of the real exchange rate of the debtor countries, the lion share of the appreciation between 2000
and 2009 was accounted for by the nominal appreciation of the euro vis-a-vis other countries.
17Chen et al. [18] also show that the external deficit of the euro-zone debtor countries was financed by capital
flows from the core euro area countries such as Germany and France leading to weaker real exchange rate adjustment
mechanisms.
18Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon [43] claim that the introduction of the euro lowered current accounts in both NEA
and SEA through the maintenance of high levels of investment.
19The appealing properties of a decreased real exchange rate in the debtor countries of the euro-zone are also
highlighted by Belke and Dreger [4].
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3 Econometric Methodology
The global financial crisis has illustrated that the linkages among economies have become
increasingly complex. It is imperative, for the methodology employed, to account for the
global interactions of macroeconomic factors. A fundamental problem of global macroe-
conomic models is the curse of dimensionality, which arises when the number of variables
is large compared to the time dimension. To overcome the curse of dimensionality Pesaran
et al. [56] (PSW hereafter) developed a global VAR for the analysis of global interdepen-
dencies and the propagation of shocks across the world economy. The GVAR methodology
consists of two steps. In the first, country-specific VARX* models are estimated, which ac-
count for the outside economy via the cross-section average of foreign variables known as
the “star” variables.20 In the second step, the estimated country-specific VARX*s are stacked
in a GVAR.21
There are also alternative approaches for modelling a large number of variables such as
FAVAR, PVAR and large Bayesian VAR. Factor models have been used as data shrinkage
procedures, which summarise the information of a large number of variables in a small num-
ber of selected factors. However, the economic interpretation of the extracted factors is a
rather difficult task.22 Alternatively, PVARs or large-scale Bayesian VARs solve the prob-
lem of dimensionality by restricting the parameter space. In particular, the PVAR imposes
restrictions on the dynamic and static interdependence and on the cross-sectional homogene-
ity. 23 Even though the GVAR model provides a coherent framework to model the global
economy and to assess both global shocks and shocks that emanate from a specific country,
to the best of our knowledge there are only three papers that apply GVAR to the issue of
international trade and global imbalances, namely Greenwood-Nimmo et al. [38], Bussière
et al. [13] (BCS hereafter) and Bettendorf [7].24, 25, 26
Their results can incite the discussion regarding the determinants of the underlying trade
imbalances at a European level. In this respect, particular focus shall be given to the dynam-
ics observed between NEA and SEA countries, focusing also on an international perspective.
The global dynamics of international trade relationships and patterns can be fully utilised un-
20Dees et al. [26] (DdPS hereafter) motivate the GVAR approach as an approximation to the global factor model.
DdPS use the cross-sectional average of the foreign variables to reflect the unobserved common factors of the global
economy. Chudik and Pesaran [21] motivate the GVAR approach as an approximation to a large system where all
variables are determined endogenously. Note that the foreign variables were assumed to be weakly exogenous.
21The GVAR has been widely applied in many fields such as global financial spillovers (PSW; Galesi and Sgherri
[32]; Chudik and Fratzscher [20]; Favero [28]), international transmission of macroeconomic shocks and global
business cycles (DdPS; Eickmeier and Ng [27]; Garratt et al. [34]), global inflation linkages (Galesi and Lombardi
[31]), forecasting of economic and financial variables (Pesaran et al. [57]) and common fiscal policies assessment
in the EU (Hebous and Zimmermann [41]; Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández [60]).
22Unlike the FAVAR, the GVAR models allow for country-specific dynamic explicitly and account for cointegra-
tion relationships.
23Canova and Ciccarelli [14] show that a PVAR shrinks the parameter space by assuming that the unknown
parameters can be decomposed into a component that is common across cross-sectional units, across all variables,
a variable specific component, lag specific component and idiosyncratic effects.
24Greenwood-Nimmo et al. [38] benefit from a larger set of data with 33 countries (26 regions) and conduct
several probabilistic forecasting exercises with a particular focus on the USA, China, the euro area and Japan based
on the model of DdPS.
25BSC point that a positive shock to the output of US leads to increased output and exports in almost all the
countries, while also they highlight the importance of the German economy in the European business cycles.
26Bettendorf [7] investigates the impact of a German wage moderation shock on the European current account
imbalances and concludes that German labour market reforms cannot be the lone driver of the European trade
imbalances.
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der the GVAR framework, as described in the following sections.
3.1 The Global VAR Modelling
We consider a world that consists of N countries, indexed by i = 0, . . . , N− 1 where i = 0
stands for the numeraire country (USA in our case). We assume that xit is a ki×1 vector of
country-specific endogenous variables and x∗it = ∑
N
j=1wi jx jt is a k
∗
i ×1 vector of the country-
specific foreign variables, where wi j ≥ 0 are the set of trade weights with ∑
N
j=1wi j = 1 and
wii = 0. Note that wi j ≥ 0 represents the share of country j to the total share of country i. The
first step in the GVARmethodology is to specify and estimate the individual country-specific
VARX*(pi, qi) models. We consider the case of VARX*(2, 1):
xit = ai0+ai1t+Φi1xi,t−1+Φi2xi,t−2+Λi0x
∗
it +Λi1x
∗
i,t−1+δ i0dt +δ i1dt−1+uit (1)
where Φil for l = 1,2 are ki× ki matrix of lagged coefficients and Λi0 and Λi1 are ki× k
∗
i
matrices of the corresponding foreign variables coefficients.27 Also, dit is a md×1 vector of
global variables (such as oil price), ai0 is a ki×1 vector of intercept terms and ai1 is a ki×1
vector of trend coefficients. The vector of country-specific shock is given by uit , where
E(uitu js) = Ωij for t = s and E(uitu js) = 0 for t 6= s. Equation (1) indicates that spillover
effects across countries can occur through three distinct but interrelated channels: i) direct
and lagged impact of x∗it on xit ; ii) dependence of country-specific variables on common
global exogenous variables (i.e. dit ); and iii) non-zero contemporaneous dependence of
shocks via cross covariances Ωi j. Equation (1) can be written as:
Aizit = Bi1zi,t−1+Bi2zi,t−2+φ it +uit (2)
where zi,t−1=(x
′
i,t−1,x
∗′
i,t−1)
′
is a ki+k∗i dimensional vector, Ai=(Iki,−Λi0), Bi1=(Φi1,Λi1),
Bi2 = (Φi2,0) and φ it = ai0+ai1t+δ i0dt +δ i1dt−1.
The second step of the GVARmodel consist of staking theN country-specific VARX*(2,1)
models in one global VAR. In particular, collecting all the country-specific variables in a
k× 1 vector x˜ = (x
′
0t ,x
′
1t , . . . ,x
′
Nt)
′
where k = ∑Ni=0 ki and using the (ki + k
∗
i )× k link ma-
trices W i = [E ′i,W˜ i], where E i and W˜ i are k× ki and k× k
∗
i dimensional selection matrices
respectively, we can write:
zit =
(
xit
x∗it
)
=W ix˜t i= 0, . . . ,N−1 (3)
Substituting (3) into (2) yields:
AiW ix˜t = Bi1W ix˜t−1+Bi2W ix˜t−2+φ it ++uit (4)
And by stacking each country-specific model in (4), we obtain the GVAR(2) model for all
the endogenous variables xt :
Hx˜t = F1x˜t−1+F2x˜t−2+φ t +ut (5)
27Any further generalisation to different lags of domestic and foreign variables is straightforward.
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whereH =


A0W 0
A1W 1
...
AN−1WN−1

, F1=


B01W 0
B11W 1
...
B(N−1)1WN−1

, F2=


B02W 0
B12W 1
...
B(N−1)2WN−1

, φ t =


φ 0t
φ 1t
...
φ (N−1)t


and ut =


u0t
u1t
...
u(N−1)t

.
The reduced form of the GVAR(2) solution is obtained from:
x˜t = G1x˜t−1+G2x˜t−2+ φ˜ t + u˜t (6)
where G1 = H−1F1, G2 = H−1F2, φ˜ t = H
−1φ t and u˜t = H
−1ut . The GVAR model (6) is
solved recursively and used for the impulse response function analysis.
4 Data and Model Specification
The employed dataset is of vital importance for this study. We do not consider countries
with data that are unavailable, unreliable or have a short time span. Our analysis consists
of quarterly data from 1980Q1 to 2016Q4 (148 observations in total) for 28 developed and
developing countries. In line with our objectives and theoretical framework, we group the
euro area countries into two sub-regions: NEA (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany and the
Netherlands) and SEA, (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). There are a number of reasons
to justify this. For example, the SEA has experienced higher inflation, unemployment rates
and government debt than the NEA. Another distinction emerges from the current account
imbalances between the NEA and SEA economies. We choose not to include France and
Ireland to any of the above regions as there is no clear evidence for their insertion in one
or another sub-region (they are included in the GVAR model as separate entities though).28
All the remaining countries are treated as independent entities. Thus, the constructed GVAR
model consists of 21 entities (see Table 1). These countries/regions cover on average 80%
of the nominal world GDP over the last five years. In comparison to the work of BCS, we
broaden the sample of countries included in the analysis (28 countries relative to 21 in BCS)
and extend the sample with 9 additional years. Furthermore, we increase the number of
endogenous variables in the GVAR model to five as we extend the set of exports, imports,
output and real exchange rate in the BCS analysis with the gross capital formation.
In particular, we construct a country-specific VARX* including 5 endogenous variables;
domestic output (nyit), gross capital formation (gc fit ), exports (exit ), imports (imit ) and the
real effective exchange rate (reerit ). Domestic output for country i is proxied by the dif-
ference between the real GDP and the real exports of goods and services at time t. We
also include the real oil price as an exogenous global variable (poilt ).29 In addition to the
5 endogenous variables, we consider three foreign variables (ny∗it ,gc f
∗
it ,reer
∗
it ). We exclude
foreign variables of exports ex∗it and imports im
∗
it from the individual models due to the pos-
28See also Gros [39] who argues that France "exhibits a mixed feature, surplus over the period 2000-2005 and
deficit afterwards".
29All variables are referring to natural logarithms of real values and are seasonally adjusted.
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sibility of collinearity.30, 31 Therefore, the vectors of country specific domestic and foreign
variables are:32, 33
xit = (nyit ,gc fit ,exit , imit ,reerit)
′
for i= 1, . . . ,N−1 and
x∗it = (ny
∗
it ,gc f
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poilt)
′
for i= 1, . . . ,N−1
For the case of the USA (where i = 0), we follow Dees et al. [26] and treat the oil price as an
endogenous variable. Thus, the USA vectors of domestic and foreign variables are:
x0t = (ny0t ,gc f0t ,ex0t , im0t ,reer0t , poilt)
′
and
x∗0t = (ny
∗
0t ,gc f
∗
0t ,reer
∗
0t)
To construct the foreign variables, we used fixed trade weights that correspond, for each
country in the sample, to the trade shares of foreign countries in total export and imports over
the period 2012-2016.34, 35 The regional variables of the NEA and SEA were constructed
using a weighted average scheme for each individual country. Following the relevant strand
of the literature, we employ average PPP-GDP weights over the period 2012-2016.
4.1 Long-Run Over-identifying Relationships in the GVAR analysis
We adopt the approach of Garratt et al. [33] and allow the short-run dynamics to be esti-
mated flexibly within a VARX framework, while also we impose theory-consistent long-run
restrictions. This will enable us to develop a model with theoretically coherent foundation,
in the otherwise unrestricted country-specific models. Garratt et al. [33] argue that economic
theory is typically more informative about the long-run relationships than it is on the short-
run period.36 Garratt et al. [33] also argue that there is a degree of consensus regarding the
long-run properties of macroeconomic models whether they have been developed within the
Simultaneous Equation Models (SEMs), structural VAR or the DSGE approaches. Alterna-
tively, there is less agreement on how to model short-run dynamic adjustment. Based on the
30As Greenwood-Nimmo et al. [38] point out, the assumption of weak-exogeneity between the foreign trade
variables and the domestic endogenous trade variables can not be sustained in a model that takes into account the
majority of the world trade, as exit = im∗it and vice-versa.
31For a detailed description of the data sources see Table A.1 in the Appendix.
32The estimation and dynamic analysis of the GVAR model is conducted using the GVAR toolbox 2.0 created by
Smith and Galesi [61].
33Due to data unavailability, we exclude from the VARX* model the real gross capital formation of China
as an endogenous variable. Therefore, the corresponding domestic variables vector for China is: xit =
(nyit ,exit , imit ,reerit)
′
.
34Although the choice of weights for the construction of foreign variables is a subject of discussion, Forbes and
Chinn [30] argue that bilateral trade is one of the most important determinants of the linkages among countries.
Moreover, PSW point out that trade weights show the extent that one country/region is linked to another. We utilise
a 21×21 trade weights link matrix using bilateral trade, based on data from the Direction of Trade Statistics. Table
2 reports the trade weight matrix for the countries/regions of major interest.
35The model has been estimated using also time-varying trade weights, covering the entire sample period (1980 -
2016) and allowing the weights to change in a rolling window of five years. The estimated parameters of the model,
as well as the results of the dynamic analysis were similar to those when employing fixed trade weights. In order to
maintain the model as much parsimonious as possible, we selected the latter case.
36This is because economic theory is frequently silent concerning the sequence of economic decisions, the struc-
ture of information sets across agents and the nature of rigidities that arise from transaction costs.
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GVAR literature, we estimate a VECMX* representation of the following equation:
∆xit = ci0−α iβ
′
i[zi,t−1−µ idi,t−1− γ i(t−1)]
+Γi∆xi,t−1+Λi∆x
∗
it +δ
∗
i0∆dt +δ
∗
i1∆dt−1+uit
(7)
where α i is a ki×ri matrix of rank ri and β i=(β
′
ix, β
′
ix∗ ,β
′
id)
′
is a (ki+k∗i +md)×ri matrix of
rank ri. The country-specific VECMX* in (7) allows for cointegration between domestic and
foreign variables. The identification of the long-run equilibrium is not trivial because there
are many linear combinations of the cointegrating vectors that are observationally equivalent
and link the level of domestic output (GDP net of exports) with the levels of capital, exports
and imports of goods and services, and the REER in an economy.37
Hence, we consider among our variables several suitable long-run relationships. To start,
assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function that depends on imported goods and exports,
we can show that domestic output net of export is given by:
nyit = cit + c1igc fit + c2iexit + c3iimit (8)
We consider equation (8) as a long run representation of the ELGH theory. This suggests
that the volumes of domestic output, capital, exports and imports would cointegrate. If
there is no evidence that equation (8) holds in an entity of our model, we also consider the
“enhanced” trade equations as they suggested by BCS. The “enhanced” trade equations allow
for cointegration among exports and imports along with the traditional demand and price
variables. Finally, we test for cointegration between the volumes of exports and imports for
each country. The following table summarises the long-run relationships considered in our
GVAR analysis.
The Long-Run Relationships in the GVAR Analysis
Export-Led-Growth Hypothesis nyit − c1ikit − c2iexit − c3iimit ∼ I(0)
“Enhanced” Trade
Equations
Exports Equation exit −a1iimit −a2iny∗it −a3ireerit ∼ I(0)
Imports Equation imit −β1iexit −β2inyit −β3ireerit ∼ I(0)
Stationarity of the Trade Balance exit − imit ∼ I(0)
4.1.1 Modelling Strategy of the country-specific VARX* models
We estimate an unrestricted VARX*(pi,qi) by selecting the lag order of the domestic vari-
ables pi based on the Akaike information criterion with p(i,max) = 2. Due to data limitations,
we include one lag for the foreign variables where qi = 1. Table 3 presents the unrestricted
estimation of the country-specific VARX* models, including the number of cointegrating
relationships, the number of selected lags, as well as the set of endogenous and exogenous
variables that employed in each model.
It is worth noting that possible misspecification of the cointegrating vectors will have
implications for the stability of GVAR, the behaviour of impulse response functions and
the shape of the persistence profiles. Here, we follow a quite similar modelling strategy as
37Note that we can choose any non-singular r× r matrix Q such as α iβ
′
i = α iQ
−′Qβ ′ = α∗i β
∗′
i . The new
coefficient matrices α∗i and β
∗′
i are observationally equivalent to α iβ
′
i respectively.
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suggested by BCS, given that the estimation of the long-run cointegrating vectors is very
sensitive to the number of selected lags. To be concrete, our estimation strategy includes
four steps. First, we estimate an unrestricted VAR including both country specific and for-
eign variables. However, because the number of cointegrating vectors might be sensitive
to the number of lags, in the second step, we estimate a smaller-scale (i.e four variables)
VARs.38 If the number of cointegrating vectors remains unchanged then, in the third step,
a cointegrating vector from the small-scale model was imposed only if the estimated coef-
ficients satisfy the theory-based restrictions. We test for all four theory-based restrictions.39
Note that we impose only the restrictions which are consistent with our priors, ensuring that
the number of cointegrating vectors in the VARX* models is equal to the number of long-run
restrictions imposed.40 In the final step, the theory-based long-run relations were imposed in
the in the country-specific VARX*. Modification of the existing long-run relationships could
potentially lead to different results. Therefore, a series of tests for the validity of the implied
overidentifying restrictions were also implemented The tests of overidentifying restrictions
were based on a likelihood-ratio test using bootstrapped critical values at the 1% signifi-
cance level. Finally, we impose only the long-run relations that satisfy the likelihood-ratio
test and at the same time exhibit satisfying Persistence Profiles (PPs)41, impulse responses
and stability of the estimated coefficients. The estimated (theory-based) cointegrating vec-
tors were then imposed in the full country-specific VARX*. Tests for the validity of the
implied overidentifying restrictions were also implemented in the latter.
Table 4 presents the final choice for the number of the estimated cointegrating vectors of
our model, the long run relationships which are imposed in the GVAR analysis, as well as
the likelihood-ratio test results. We observe that all the imposed overidentifying restrictions
hold as the null hypothesis can not be rejected.42 Table 4 also shows that for the cases of
NEA and France cointegrating vectors provide evidence of export-oriented growth strategy
pursued by these countries. The estimated cointegrating vectors for the SEA and the UK
satisfy the import equation. Finally, there is evidence that the export equation and the trade
balance are stationary for the USA and China respectively.43
4.2 The Impact Elasticities between the Domestic and the Foreign
Variables of the Model
An informative aspect of our analysis is the contemporaneous effects of the foreign variables
on their domestic counterparts, which can be interpreted as the impact elasticities of the
former variables to the latter. These are derived from the country-specific VECMX* estima-
tions. High impact elasticities would reflect the connectedness of the global economy and the
38In order to estimate the corresponding long run unrestricted coefficients of the cointegrating relationships, we
employed smaller scale VAR(q) models, separately for each of the 21 entities of the model.
39In particular, we impose and estimate the appropriate long-run restrictions in smaller scale VAR(q) models
in order to retrieve the long run unrestricted values of the c1i,c2i,c3i,a1i,a2i,a3i,β1i,β2i and β3i parameters, as
previously described based on the long run relationships that our analysis takes into account.
40For example, for the NEA, there was only one cointegrating vector but the estimated coefficients were consistent
both with ELGH and the "enchanced" import equation. We decide to impose the former relationship because there
is a consensus that the NEA countries pursued an export-led growth model.
41See Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
42In general, we include overidentifying restrictions for 15 of the 21 entities of our model. For the countries
that we could not establish a long-run relationship (Brazil, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland), we
imposed the cointegrating vectors that suggested by the unrestricted VARX* models, as illustrated in Table 3.
43The implementation of the GVAR analysis requires tests for unit root, structural breaks, pairwise correlation
and test for weak exogeneity. All these tests are presented and discussed in the Appendix.
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interdependence of the domestic variables across countries. Table 5 presents the impact elas-
ticities between domestic and foreign variables along with the associated heteroscedasticity
consistent Newey and West t-ratio’s.
Most of the impact elasticities are high in magnitude and statistically significant. For
example, we observed that in most countries/regions, the elasticity of real net export output,
as captured through the impact of ny∗it on nyit , is positive and significant. In particular, in SEA
and China there is evidence that a 1% change in the foreign real net export output (i.e. ny∗it )
is linked with positive and statistically significant effects by 0.28% and 0.29% respectively
on their domestic counterparts (i.e. nyit ); UK and France will observe an impact increase in
their domestic output by 0.36% and 0.17% respectively. Interestingly, the Korean domestic
output has the greatest impact elasticity (1.42) which is aligned with the outward-oriented
structure of the Korean economy. On the contrary, the non-export output in the US and the
NEA is not affected by the foreign activity in a statistically significant manner.44
Table 5 also provides evidence that the impact elasticity of real effective exchange rate
(reerit and reer∗it ) is negative and significant in export-oriented economies such as NEA, the
UK, Japan and Ireland. This implies that a global appreciation is associated with a domestic
depreciation of the exporting economies, which has positive effects on their competitiveness.
When we examine the response of gross capital formation (gc fit and gc f ∗it ), we observe that
in most of the countries it is positive and mainly significant, especially for the developed
economies.45
5 Empirical Analysis
This section examines the dynamic behaviour of the estimated GVAR model. We focus
on the global transmission mechanisms of real demand-side shocks and real expansionary
shocks with a particular focus on the degree of regional interdependencies between NEA and
SEA.We also assess the domestic and international effects of changes in real competitiveness
based on different simulations of real effective exchange rate shocks. To investigate the
dynamic properties of the model, we employ the GIRFs, as proposed by Koop et al. [48] and
developed further by Pesaran and Shin [53]. We do so because of (i) the absence of strong
prior information and (ii) the multi-country setting that includes 105 endogenous variables.
These two factors make the identification of structural shocks in the underlying structural
model particularly challenging.
Unlike the conventional orthogonalised impulse response functions, the GIRFs are order-
invariant. Although they reflect the impact of a unit shock and not the impact of an unob-
served structural shock, they can still provide useful information concerning the dynamic
properties of the model.46 Alternatively, we could impose either a recursive structure or
sign restrictions on the endogenous variables of a core country-region assuming that shocks
across countries are correlated.47 Note that while recursive identification based on exclusion
restrictions has been severely criticised as being atheoretical, the sign-identified VARmodels
44This is consistent with the argument that the US is a relatively closed economy.
45Exception to this is capital elasticities for the Asian economies (Japan, Korea, India and Indonesia) which are
negative, indicating a trade-off in the allocation of investments between the Western and the Asian economies.
46Indeed, in practice real demand, output and trade shocks are likely to be highly correlated across the different
regions of the model. All shock responses refer to mean estimates of 2000 bootstrap replications along with the
corresponding 90% error bounds.
47The former approach has been followed by Dees et al. [25], while the latter from Eickmeier and Ng [27] and
Georgiadis [35].
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are only set identified. In particular, there is a wide range of structural models that satisfy
the identifying sign- restrictions.48 It is clear that there is no consensus of which statistic
to report about the identification of theory-consistent structural shocks. Therefore, we focus
on the implication of GIRFs which provide useful information about the dynamic proper-
ties of country-specific shocks, which are assumed to be correlated across countries and
regions. We also consider identification through Orthogonalised Impulse Response Func-
tions (OIRFs) under the GVAR framework, as implemented by Dees et al. [26], in order to
conduct a robustness check complementary to the GIRFs analysis. The results are qualita-
tively similar in the two approaches. For more information regarding the OIRFs analysis see
subsection A.1 and Figure A.3 in the Appendix.49
We focus on the interaction of shocks emanated from the NEA and SEA respectively. In
doing so, we also estimate a small-scale GVAR including only the two regions (i.e. NEA and
SEA) and we test for exogeneity of the endogenous variables. Evidence of exogeneity will
help to identify the spillover of shocks across the two regions.50 Table A.3, in the Appendix,
presents exogeneity test among the NEA and SEA variables. There is a strong evidence that
when we estimate a GVAR including only NEA and SEA for the large majority of the cases,
we can not reject the null of exogeneity. An exception to this is the capital formation which
found to be endogenous in most cases. This implies that shocks across the two regions are
exogenous while they are endogenous within regions.
In what follows, we examine the time profile of shocks to macroeconomic variables. In
particular, we simulate the following scenarios: i) the impact of a positive non-export real
output shock to the NEA on SEA variables; ii) the effects of a positive shock to real imports
of both the NEA and the SEA; iii) the response of global economy to a real exchange rate
depreciation shock of the SEA.
5.1 Positive Real Output shock to the NEA
Figure 2(a) illustrates the impact of a positive one standard-deviation shock to the non-export
real output of the NEA. Both in the NEA and the SEA, there is a significant increase of out-
put that remains positive, in the medium and the long-run.51 In response to a positive output
shock, investments in the NEA increase and current account deteriorates.52 The counter-
cyclical movement of the current account is consistent both with the traditional and modern
theories of current account model. The traditional theories claim that an increase in output
will increase demand for foreign goods and this worsens the current account. Modern the-
ories argue that an increase of output might reflect a positive productivity shock which, in
turn, will have a positive impact on investments.53 Therefore, an increase of output driven
by a positive and persistent productivity shock will increase investment and worsen the cur-
rent account.54 It is worth noting that the response of real exchange to output shock is not
48Kilian and Murphy [45] and Inoue and Kilian [42] argue that the posterior median response function can be
very misleading about the most likely dynamic response in the sign-identified models. Inoue and Kilian [42] show
that the most likely structural model can be computed by the model of the joint distribution of admissible models.
49The full set of results regarding the OIRFs analysis, is available upon request.
50Note that identification of individual shocks will still require sign or zero restrictions.
51On impact, output increases by 0.35% and 0.05% in NEA and SEA respectively.
52Note that investments are proxied by gross capital formation.
53Mendoza [50] shows that an increase of real interest rate is a likely response to a positive and persistent pro-
ductivity shock.
54Current account is given by CA = (Y+ rB - T) - C - I + (T - G) or CA = Private Saving - Investment - Budget
Deficit. Note that I denotes investment and private saving is the sum of GDP (i.e. Y) plus income on net foreign
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significant. This might be due to the low elasticity of substitution between tradables goods
of NEA and SEA. More formally, Corsetti et al. [24] show that under financial autarky the
real exchange rate of tradable goods is given by:
RER=
2αH −1
1−2αH(1−ω)
(ŶH − ŶF)
where ŶH is domestic output, ŶF is the foreign output, αH is the share of domestically pro-
duced goods in domestic consumption and ω is the elasticity of substitution between do-
mestic and foreign tradables goods. For low values of ω , the relationship between RER and
relative output can be negative or even equal to zero.55
There is also evidence that in the SEA, there is a deterioration of the trade balance as ex-
ports decline significantly while the response of imports is not statistically significant. King
and Rebelo [47] show that productivity shocks will lead to an increase in the real interest rate
and an appreciation of the real exchange rate which, in turn, will affect exports negatively.
Furthermore, the response of investment is not significantly different from zero due to a sig-
nificant appreciation of the real exchange rate. Note that an appreciation of the real exchange
rate might reflect either an deterioration in terms of trade (i.e. a decline of foreign prices) or
an increase in unit labour cost (ULC).56,57 An appreciation of the real exchange rate driven
by an increase of ULC might reflect capital misallocation in SEA. 58 This is consistent with
evidence provided by Gopinath et al. [37] and Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon [43]. However,
Chen et al. [18] show that appreciation of the real exchange rate in the SEA is mainly due to
an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. In summary, a positive output shock in NEA
has a negative impact on the trade balance of both NEA and SEA.
Figure 2(b) indicates the spillovers effects of a positive shock to the non-export real
output of the NEA to the real output of the rest of the economies available in our sample. In
general, there is a positive and significant response in European economies such as France,
Switzerland and Sweden while non-export output in the USA respond in an insignificant
manner. Finally, there is a noticeable positive impact on Asian economies including China,
India and Japan.
5.2 Positive Expansionary shock to the NEA
Figure 3(a) depicts the impulse responses of NEA and SEA variables to a positive one-
standard-deviation shock to the NEA real imports. There is evidence of a strong positive
assets (i.e. rB minus taxes and (i.e. T) and consumption (i.e. C) while budget deficit is the difference between
government spending and taxes (i.e. G-T).
55In particular, for ω < 2αH−12αH the real exchange rate appreciates in response to a home positive supply shock.
56Chen et al. [18] show that we can decompose the real exchange rate into three components:
RER=
(
SP∗NEAT
PT
)αγ (
PEA−T
PT
)γ(1−α)(
(SWNEA)α (W ∗EA)1−α
W
)1−γ
where S is the nominal exchange rate defined as domestic prices relative to foreign prices. Note that in our empirical
estimation, we used data defined the other way around. P∗NEA−T is the price level of non-eurozone trading partners,
P∗EA−T is the euro-zone trading partners, α is the share of trade with the non euro-zone countries, γ indicates the
share of tradable goods and P is the domestic price level. An appreciation of nominal exchange rate will improve
the terms of trade as reflected by the first term while worsens the relative wage competitiveness proxied by the third
term.
57Appreciation of real exchange rate is also consistent with Corsetti et al. [23].
58Note that the non-significant response of real exchange rate in NEA might be due to the reduction of ULC
which offset an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, for further details see Chen et al. [18].
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response of real import and cross-capital formation in both regions (i.e. NEA and SEA).
Assuming that a positive shock on imports reflects a demand shocks such as temporary tax
decrease, a positive response of investment might be driven by an increase of capital return.
For example, Baxter [3] argues that a temporary fiscal expansion leads individuals to smooth
consumption (i.e. decrease consumption) and increase labour supply which in turn will lead
to an increase of capital return and investments. We also observe a depreciation of real
exchange rate which has positive effects on exports due to substitution and wealth effects.59
The response of output in the SEA is insignificant while there is an initial decline in
output in NEA for two quarters following the shock. The frail response of output to an
import shock might be driven by boosted exports as observed in Figure 3(b). However,
exports in both regions (i.e. NEA and SEA) increase less than imports following the import
shock in NEA. Therefore, an expansionary demand shock in NEA leads to a deterioration of
the NEA and SEA current account, albeit the deterioration is rather marginal.
We next focus on the impact of real NEA import shocks to the exports of the countries
included in our sample. Figure 3(b) indicates that an expansionary shock in NEA yields a
statistically significant increase in the global real exports highlighting the importance of the
trade linkages in the transmission of shocks around the world.60 Furthermore, Figure 3(b)
also shows that import expansion in NEA has a positive impact on the exports of France,
UK, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland. This implies that increasing imports in NEA might
be used as an adjustment mechanism for the trade imbalances in euro area.
5.3 Positive Expansionary shock to the SEA
The third shock examines whether SEA relies on domestic consumption as a mechanism
of economic growth. Therefore, Figure 4(a) shows the impact of a positive one standard-
deviation shock to the real imports in the SEA. In general, there is a positive and significant
response of all SEA variables (imports, output, gross capital formation and real exchange
rate), while in NEA there is a significant increase only for real imports. An appreciation of
real exchange rate and a positive response of investment in SEA is consistent with Obstfeld
and Rogoff [51] who argue that due to the limited integration of capital market there is home
bias on demand shocks. Therefore, a positive demand shock will appreciate the terms of
trade and improve the real return of domestic investments.61, 62
Figure 4(b) illustrates that there is a positive and significant increase of exports both in
NEA and SEA.63 While the response of export in NEA crowding out the response of import
59Note that Corsetti et al. [24] show that a depreciation of terms of trade has positive impacts on the foreign
demand of domestic goods due to income and substitution effects:
∂C∗H
∂δt
−SE(YF ,αH ,ω)+ IE(YF ,αH ,ω)
60Concerning the response of real exports in NEA and SEA we observed an increase of 0.6% and 0.4% respec-
tively.
61An appreciation of real exchange rate will reduce the cost of investment as investment goods consists of im-
ported goods. A lower investment cost will increase the capital return of domestic investments.
62The terms of trade is given by PD
PF
where PD is the price of domestically produced goods while PF is the price
of goods produced in foreign countries. Corsetti and Müller [22] show that the return to investment in real terms
is given by: Real Return to investment = (Marginal product in terms of domestic goods)× PD
P
where P denotes the
price of domestic consumption. Therefore, an increase in the ratio due to an expansionary fiscal shock and home
bias will have a positive impact on the real return of domestic investments.
63The effect on other European economies is also statistically significant with French, the UK and Swedish
exports increasing by approximately 0.25% after one year. There is also evidence of a positive effect on Chinese,
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the reverse is true in the SEA. Our results provide support of the view that the co-existence of
two growth strategies led to the accumulation of trade imbalances between NEA and SEA.
In particular, NEA countries have built on institutions and policies that promote the ELG
policies. Alternatively, SEA economies, rely on increased domestic demand as a mechanism
of growth promotion. This structure generated cumulative current account surpluses and
incited external lending in NEA (mirrored by current account deficit and net borrowing in
SEA).
5.4 Real Depreciation of the SEA
This part examines the view that improving competitiveness in the SEA will accelerate the
current account adjustment. Note that although demand shocks both in NEA and SEA have
a positive impact on investments and exports of SEA, the current account adjustment was
incomplete. In particular, there is a deterioration of the current account due to a higher
increase of imports than exports following a demand shock as proxied by a shock on im-
ports. Therefore, we investigate the role of the real exchange rate as a mechanism of cur-
rent account adjustment. In so doing, we provide information concerning the argument that
demand shocks accompanied by an improvement in competitiveness can help to eliminate
trade imbalance within the euro-zone. To this end, we consider the impact of a one-standard-
deviation negative shock (i.e. a depreciation) to the SEA real effective exchange rate on both
the real exchange rates and on the real exports of the rest of the countries in our sample.64
Figure 5(a) provides evidence that for most of the euro-area countries real exchange rate
depreciates but by less than the depreciation of the real exchange rate in SEA.65 For exam-
ple, while the real exchange rate in SEA depreciates by 0.8%, it is marginally significantly
different from zero in NEA and insignificant for the UK and Switzerland. Alternatively, for
the non euro area countries real exchange rates appreciate but in most cases, appreciation is
not statistically different from zero.66
Figure 5(b) indicates that a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate increased real
exports in SEA by 0.7% per quarter while the response of real imports is not significant. We
also observed that a depreciation has a negative impact on real output and investment but
are significant only in the short-run (i.e. 2 quarters following the shock). This might be due
to the negative impact that a depreciation has on the real return of domestic investment.67
Alternatively, the response of NEA variables to a depreciation shock of the real exchange
rate of the SEA is rather frail. Only the real output decreases significantly but only a few
quarters. This finding is in line with Belke and Dreger [4] who suggest the depreciation of
the real exchange rate of debtor euro-zone countries as a tool to current account adjustment.
5.4.1 Implications of SEA’s Real Depreciation for Productivity
Although depreciation of real exchange rate can be used as an adjustment mechanism of
current account imbalances, it might also undermine domestic economic growth by reducing
Turkish and Japanese exports.
64We measure the nominal exchange rate as the ratio of foreign prices to domestic prices. Therefore, a decrease
of real exchange rate reflects a depreciation of domestic currency.
65This might reflect a reduction of ULC imposed by structural reforms in SEA after the financial crisis of 2008.
66In particular, the real exchange rates in the USA and China appreciate statistically significant by a 0.3% and
0.4% respectively after 4 quarters. There is also evidence of appreciation in Japan, Turkey and emerging Asian
economies. Note that in all cases appreciation was not statistically significant.
67For further details see Corsetti et al. [23].
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investments. Therefore, it is consequential to analyse the two main channels through which
a depreciation of real exchange rate can be achieved.
First, a reduction of real wages can lead to lower domestic prices and depreciation of
real exchange rates. However, a reduction of real wages will have also negative direct and
indirect income effects. The indirect income effects show, as stressed by Corsetti et al. [23],
that if the the substitution effects between domestic and foreign tradables is low, then a de-
preciation of the terms of trade will have a negative impact on the consumption of domestic
tradables. The latter is currently the main driving mechanism of European growth.68 Fur-
thermore, a depreciation of real exchange rate will not only reduce domestic prices but also
foreign prices by lowering the costs of intermediate goods used in the production of foreign
goods. Therefore, depreciation through reduction of real wages might not improve the com-
petitiveness of domestic goods. In this setting, a deprecation of real exchange rate will have
short-run impact on current account.
Second, depreciation via an improvement of productivity can have a positive impact on
current account without threatening the sustainability of economic growth. Cette et al. [17]
show that labour and market regulation in Europe impair the diffusion of innovation related
to the production and use of information technology. For example, Cette and Lopez [16]
show that the U.S. benefited from the use of highest level of information and communication
technologies, which requires a high level of post-secondary education among the working
age population and less restrictive product and labour regulation. However, Borio et al. [10]
and Cecchetti and Kharroubi [15] show that credit booms might damage the economy be-
cause financial institutions’ high dependence for skilled labour crowed out more productive
sectors, such as manufacturing industries that are either R&D intensive or hold less tangible
assets.
A number of studies find that allocation of resources worsen in SEA but not in NEA. An
inefficient use of resources in Southern Europe reduced the total factor productivity (TFP).69
Reis [59], Gopinath et al. [37] and Cette et al. [17] argue that the main driving force of
capital misallocation in SEA was the low real interest rate and abundant capital inflows after
the inception of euro lead to inefficient use of resources and lower TFP. This mechanism
blend with a boom of consumption of imported tradables while non-tradables were produced
by small and inefficient firms led to lower TFP in SEA.70 Furthermore, Gopinath et al. [37]
show that missalocation measured by the standard deviation of marginal labour product has
increased within manufacturing industries.
6 Conclusion
The global imbalances that emerged after the 2000s have been blamed as a contributor to the
recent financial crisis of 2008. Obstfeld and Rogoff [52] argue that current account surpluses
from emerging economies have been used to fund deficits in developed economies, which in
turn has fuelled the risk-taking behaviour of the latter countries, thereby showing the seed of
68Corsetti et al. [24] show that a depreciation of terms of trade have positive substitution and negative income
effects. They also show that if the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is low, then the
impact of the latter effects will out-weight the former.
69Cette et al. [17] show that since the inception of euro the TFP in Spain, Portugal and Italy has been close to
zero or even negative.
70Kalantzis [44] and Benigno et al. [6] show that the share of non-tradables in domestic production increase after
episodes of capital inflows.
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the global financial crisis.71 Therefore, it is important to investigate sources and patterns of
trade imbalances. The aim of our study is to analyse trade imbalances within the euro-zone,
accounting for the global macroeconomic environment. The co-existence of two growth
models within the euro-zone made inevitable the development of trade imbalances between
the north and the south euro area: the former with an export-oriented economy, while the
latter based on domestic consumption.
There is a view supported by the US Treasury [62] and Krugman [49] that the current ac-
count adjustment within the euro-zone should be symmetric, in the sense that NEA surpluses
should shrink along with the SEA deficits. The counter-argument of this view endured by
Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon [43] is that the SEA should pursue policies that increase gov-
ernment saving, productivity and competitiveness through internal devaluation. Our paper
contributes to the debate by evaluating the view that an expansionary policy from NEA ac-
companied by an increased competitiveness in SEA can accelerate the adjustment of trade
imbalances within the euro area.
We do so by using a GVAR model for 28 countries including the NEA, SEA regions, the
USA, China and other European and non European countries. The GVAR model provides
a framework that allows investigating the spill-over effects of demand or competitiveness
shocks emanating from any country in our sample. Here, we focus on the spillover effects
of demands shocks from NEA and SEA across the two regions. In doing so, we can provide
information on the argument that expansionary policy fromNEA can be used as a mechanism
to boost economic growth and current account adjustment in the SEA. However, current
account adjustment driven mainly by demand forces is likely to unwind if the economy
moves to a different phase of business cycle. For example, although an expansionary policy
pursued during expansion might improve the current account of SEA countries, it will have
unwelcome effects once the economy slows down and move into a recession. Therefore, we
also investigate the impact of competitiveness shocks as reflected by a devaluation of the real
effective exchange rate of the SEA on the current account of both regions.
Empirical results support the argument that current account adjustment in euro-zone
should be symmetric. In particular, we observe that although positive demand shocks, in
both regions, as proxied by an increase in imports has positive effects on exports and invest-
ment, current accounts deteriorate or at best remain stable. However, there is evidence that a
devaluation of the real effective exchange rate in SEA leads to an increase in exports without
affecting imports. Therefore, our results highlight that the imperative external adjustment
of the SEA sub-region should be composed of two coordinated policies: First, increased
consumption of the NEA, which will stimulate the demand for imported goods in the sub-
region and thus, will expand the export sector of the SEA. Second, a devaluation of the real
exchange rate in the SEA, possibly through the mechanism of labour costs, should provide a
valuable policy tool for competitiveness and current account adjustment in the sub-region.
Our results should be translated with caution. From the perspective of the SEA if one
has to choose a policy then an internal devaluation will have a positive effect on their exports
and negative on their output and on their imports. The alternative policy would be an expan-
sionary shock to the NEA. This would affect SEA exports positively (not as much as in the
previous scenario though) and their imports positively. A combination of the two policies
emerges as the preferred option. The cautionary note that should not be underestimated here
71Alternatively, Borio and Disyatat [9] argue that from a macro-prudential point of view the main factor that
drives the international crisis of 2008 was the phenomenal increase of gross capital flows. They show that the link
between the financial crisis and trade imbalances was rather weak.
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is that the devaluation in the SEA might have a negative impact on investment and economic
growth (see Corsetti et al. [23]).
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Table 1: Countries and Regions in the GVAR Model
China South Europe Scandinavia Rest of the World
France Greece Norway India
Japan Italy Sweden Indonesia
UK Portugal Korea
USA Spain South Africa
Turkey
North Europe Other Developed Economies Latin America
Austria Australia Brazil
Belgium Canada Mexico
Finland Ireland
Germany Switzerland
Netherlands New Zealand
Table 2: Trade Weights of the GVAR model
Country/Region China France Japan NEA SEA Sweden UK USA
China 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.25
France 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.44 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.08
Japan 0.33 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.22
NEA 0.12 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.12
SEA 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.37 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.08
Sweden 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.43 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.07
UK 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.32 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.13
USA 0.20 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00
Note: Trade weights based on data from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
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Table 3: The specification for the country-specific unrestricted VARX* models
Country/Region
Individual VECMX*models specification
pi qi Deterministics Case r Endogenous Variables Exogenous Variables
USA 2 1 IV 3 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit , poil} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it}
North Europe 2 1 III 1 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
South Europe 2 1 III 1 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
UK 1 1 III 1 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
France 2 1 III 1 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
China 2 1 III 1 {nyit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Japan 2 1 IV 2 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Korea 2 1 IV 2 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Canada 2 1 IV 3 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Australia 1 1 III 1 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Ireland 2 1 III 1 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Sweden 2 1 III 1 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Switzerland 2 1 IV 3 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Norway 2 1 IV 2 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
New Zealand 2 1 III 1 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Mexico 2 1 III 2 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Brazil 2 1 IV 3 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Indonesia 2 1 III 2 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
India 2 1 III 0 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Turkey 2 1 III 2 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
South Africa 2 1 III 1 {nyit ,kit ,exit , imit ,reerit} {ny∗it ,k
∗
it ,reer
∗
it , poil}
Notes: Deterministics case IV indicates constant and restricted trend in the VECMX* estimation. Case III indicates only constant. r refers to
the number of cointegrating relationships as indicated by the Johansen’s test.
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Table 4: Over-identified Long Run Restrictions in the GVAR model
Country/ Region Imposed Restrictions Theoretical equation r LLR(df) 99% CV
Australia nyt −0.90kt −0.38ext +0.47imt ELGH 1 16.96(8) 31.34
Brazil 3
Canada ext − imt TB∼ I(0) 1 51.72(9) 53.83
China ext − imt TB∼ I(0) 1 24.15(7) 32.65
France nyt −1.54kt −0.58ext +1.18imt ELGH 1 27.05(8) 34.92
Indonesia imt −0.38ext −1.01nyt −0.44reert Imports Equation 1 26.85(8) 33.60
India ext − imt TB∼ I(0) 1 12.69(8) 42.05
Ireland nyt −0.55k−0.60ext +0.53imt ELGH 1 16.29(8) 31.75
Japan 2
Korea ext − imt TB∼ I(0) 1 29.00(9) 46.09
Mexico 2
North Europe nyt −3.14kt −3.38ext +5.02imt ELGH 1 10.68(8) 29.92
Norway nyt −2.29kt −0.35ext +3.03imt ELGH 1 46.08(9) 53.41
New Zealand ext −0.69imt −0.25ny∗t +0.67reert Exports Equation 1 14.98(8) 29.81
South Africa
South Europe imt −0.86ext −0.94nyt −1.02reert Imports Equation 1 22.61(8) 34.73
Sweden 1
Switzerland 3
Turkey
nyt −0.55kt −1.72ext +1.67imt ELGH 2 46.95(14) 53.78
ext −0.85imt −0.41ny∗t +0.17reert Exports Equation
UK imt −0.57ext −1.40nyt −0.24reert Imports Equation 1 28.85(8) 31.78
USA ext −0.47imt −0.82ny∗t +1.6reert Exports Equation 1 10.62(9) 31.77
Notes: Imposed restrictions refer to the theory-based equations that imposed to the cointegrating vector βi of each individual VECMX*model.
r refers to the number of cointegrating vectors imposed. Log-Likelihood Ratio test was based on 2000 bootstrapped replications.
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Table 5: Impact Elasticities between Domestic and Foreign Variables
Country/Region
Domestic Variables
ny k reer
USA 0.07 0.60 0.11
[0.56] [3.28] [0.52]
North Europe 0.19 0.54 -0.44
[0.82] [3.56] [-2.85]
South Europe 0.28 0.54 0.31
[3.11] [3.66] [1.22]
UK 0.36 0.45 -1.78
[2.58] [1.86] [-3.78]
France 0.17 0.42 1.09
[2.92] [3.28] [5.90]
China 0.29 0.30
[2.10] [0.59]
Japan 0.30 -0.06 -0.92
[1.65] [-0.47] [-4.42]
India 0.27 -0.08 0.45
[1.86] [-0.65] [2.13]
Korea 1.42 -0.04 0.08
[2.16] [-0.10] [0.30]
Canada 0.35 0.45 0.03
[1.72] [2.02] [0.19]
Australia 0.23 0.57 0.26
[1.71] [2.21] [0.72]
Ireland -0.47 0.40 -0.82
[-0.85] [1.18] [-2.97]
Sweden 0.46 0.93 0.08
[3.31] [5.94] [0.21]
Switzerland 1.50 -0.25 -0.64
[1.19] [-0.44] [-1.93]
Note: Newey-West t-ratio’s in brackets.
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Figure 1: Trade Imbalances in the Euro Area (Average values from 1999 - 2016)
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Figure 2: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to North Euro Area
Non-Export Real Output∗
((a)) response of Euro-area variables
((b)) Effects on real domestic demand after 4 quarters
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
26CHISIR., MOURAT., PANAG.: THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE, THE EURO AND THE WORLD
Figure 3: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to North Euro area
Real Imports∗
((a)) response of Euro-area variables
((b)) Effects on real exports after 4 quarters
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
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Figure 4: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to South Euro Area
Real Imports∗
((a)) response of Euro-area variables
((b)) Effects on real exports after 4 quarters
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
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Figure 5: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Negative one s.d. shock to South Euro Area
Real Exchange Rate∗
((a)) Effects on real effective exchange rates after 4 quarters
((b)) response of Euro-area domestic variables
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
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Appendix
A.1 Unit Root Tests
The implementation of the GVAR requires that the variables included in a country-specific
VARX*(pi,qi) are integrated of order one (I(1)). We test for unit root using the weighted-
symmetric Augmented Dickey-Fuller (WS ADF) introduced by Park and Fuller (1995).72
Table A.2 summarises the results from the unit root tests. In this respect, results suggest
that the null hypothesis of a unit root in not rejected for the vast majority of the domestic
variables.73 Results also demonstrate that all foreign “star” variables and the oil price are
I(1) processes.
A.2 Weak Exogeneity Test
The main assumption underlying the estimation of a VARX*(pi,qi) is that the country-
specific foreign variables are x∗it are weakly exogenous. Weak exogeneity of x
∗
it in the
VECMX* (pi,qi) model implies that domestic variables xit do not affect foreign variables x∗it
in the long run, without ruling out any short-run feedback between the two set of variables.74
If the weak exogeneity assumption is not rejected then x∗it is considered as a “long-run forc-
ing” for xit .75 Following the approach of DdPS, we employed a test for the weak exogeneity
based on Johansen (1992) and Harbo et al. (1998) who suggested an F-test to check whether
the estimated error correction terms are statistically significant in the marginal distribution
of x∗it . In particular, for each variable l of x
∗
it the following auxiliary model is estimated:
∆x∗it,l = αi,l +∑
ri
j=1 θi j,lECMi j,t−1+∑
p∗i
s=1φ is,l∆xi,t−s+∑
q∗i
s=1ψ is,l∆xˆ
∗
i,t−s+ eit,l
where ECMi j,t−1, j = 1, . . . ,ri are the estimated error correction terms which correspond to
the ri cointegrating relations (overidentifying restricted when long run relations imposed) for
the i-th country model. Note that, ∆xˆ∗i,t = (∆x
∗
′
it ,∆poilt) where ∆poilt is the global variable
of the oil price. The test for weak exogeneity is a joint test that θi j,l = 0 for j = 1,2, ...ri.
Results from the F-test are summarised in Table A.4 and indicate that the null hypothesis
is rejected for 16 out of the 83 foreign variables (19% of the cases), at the 5% significance
level.76 It is worth noting that when we increase the lag order of the VARX*(p∗i ,q
∗
i ) to p
∗
i = 4
and q∗i = 4, the null hypothesis is rejected only in 7 out of the 83 foreign variables (8%).
77
Overall, weak exogeneity can not be rejected.
72The lag length of the test was determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
73However, some minor exceptions do exist. Real domestic output in Brazil and Ireland found to be I(2) while
in Mexico found I(0). Moreover, real exports are I(0) in the case of Japan and Switzerland (the Swiss imports also
found I(0)). In addition, the real effective exchange rate in Mexico and Sweden appears to be a I(0) process.
74The lag orders of the test for the domestic p∗i and foreign q
∗
i variables need not be the same with the estimated
VARX*(p∗i ,q
∗
i ) models. For this reason, we conduct the tests for weak exogeneity based on both the lag structure
determined by the AIC (where p∗i = 1 and q
∗
i = 1) and the lags of the underlying estimated VARX* models. We
also use a larger set of lags (p∗i = 4 and q
∗
i = 4) in order to capture any sensitivity effects of the model.
75This implies that the error-correction term does not provide any information about the marginal distribution of
x∗it .
76Note that the null hypothesis is rejected for the foreign output of France and China and for the REER of the
NEA and the USA.
77All exogeneity test have been implemented conditional on the theory-based overidentifying restrictions.
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A.3 Average Pair-Wise Cross Section Correlations
An extension of the diagnostics concerning the weak-exogeneity of the foreign variables in
the sense that Cov(x∗it ,uit)→ 0 when N → ∞ is provided by the average cross-section pair-
wise correlations of the country-specific error terms. This informal test offers evidence of
the degree at which the constructed foreign variables act to reduce cross-section correlations
in the GVAR model.
Table A.5 presents the average pair-wise cross-sectional correlations for the level and
the first difference of the endogenous variables, as well as the associated model’s residu-
als.78 Results show that the average cross-section correlations for the levels of endogenous
variables are high with the exception of the real effective exchange rate. The highest cor-
relations are observed in the trade variables with an average of 97% whilst the correlations
for the cases of net trade output and capital formation vary between 75% and 83%. When
the first difference of the variables is considered, the correlations fall substantially for all
variables and for all countries.79 Finally, the residual interdependencies for all VARX* mod-
els are relatively small which enhance the view that the weakly exogenous foreign variables
successfully capture the common factors among the variables.
A.3 Structural Stability Tests
An issue that can arise in our empirical framework is the presence of structural breaks. We
employ a battery of tests to determine the stability of the estimated parameters of the country-
specific models. As the short-run parameters reflect the propagation of shocks across coun-
tries, we focus on the stability of the short-run coefficients in the VECMX* models. Follow-
ing Ploberger and Cramer (1992) our set of structural stability tests is based on the cumu-
lative sums of the OLS residual tests denoted by PKsup and PKmsq. We also employed the
Nyblom (1989) test for time-varying parameters and sequential Wald tests such as QLR,MW
and APW.80
Table A.6 summarises the results obtained from the structural stability test at the 5%
significance level under the null hypothesis of parameter stability. Evidence from structural
stability tests are rather mixed. In particular, using the PKsup and PKmsq tests the null hy-
pothesis is rejected in 11 and 10 cases respectively out of the possible 105. However, results
obtained from the non-robust version of sequential Wald tests indicate a high rejection rate
of the null hypothesis varying from 40% to 50%. These results could be rather worrying
but the heteroscedasticity-robust version of these tests provide a different outcome with the
rejection rate being halved in most cases.81 Furthermore, the rejection of the null hypothesis
78For example, the average pair-wise correlation of real output of country i is given by:
nyi = (1/N)∑
N
j=1
ρi j(nyi j)
where ρi j is the correlation of the real output of country i with country j, N is the number of countries included in
our sample. The residuals are obtained after estimating all country-specific VARX∗ (pi,qi) models.
79For example, the average cross-section correlations have declined in net export real output and gross capital
formation to 3% and 7% respectively.
80Note that PKsup and PKmsq refer to maximal OLS cumulative sum (CUSUM) statistics. QLR refers to the
likelihood ratio statistic proposed by Quant (1960) whileMW refers to a Wald statistic based on Hansen (1992) and
Andrews and Ploberger (1994). APW is an exponential average statistic based also on the work of Andrews and
Ploberger (1994). For further details on structural stability test statistics see Dees et al. (2007).
81It is worth noting that results vary across the different endogenous variables. For example, the rejection rate for
the trade variables is slightly higher than the other domestic variables which might be due to the collapse of global
trade in 2009.
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was mainly driven by breaks in the error variance and not on the parameter coefficient. We
account for the problem of possible variation of error variances by using robust standard
errors when investigating the impact of the foreign variables.
A.4 Identification Through Orthogonalized Impulse Response
Functions
In this part, we employ OIRFs for the GVAR model under the framework suggested by Dees
et al. (2007). We consider an identification scheme for the shocks stemming from the euro
area domestic variables under the ordering xit = (reerit ,exit , imit ,gc fit,nyit). Greenwood-
Nimmo et al. (2015) also consider a similar ordering of domestic variables regarding the
derivation of generalized connectedness measures based on a GVAR approach. In order to
identify euro area shocks, the corresponding ordering for countries/regions is the following:
the first countries/regions in our ordering are NEA, SEA, France and Ireland which represent
the euro area. Next, the remaining countries of our model follow based on their average real
GDP in 2010 US dollars, namely i = USA, China, Japan, UK,. . . , New Zealand. The results
are similar to those of the GIRFs. See Figure A.3 for a brief description of the results. The
full set of the OIRFs analysis results, is available upon request.
A.5 Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
A complementary extension of the impulse response functions is the traditional analysis of
forecast error variance decomposition. Under the GVAR model, the estimated GIRFs cor-
respond to Generalised Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (GFEVDs) as explained by
DdPS. In this case, GFEVDs show the proportion of the n-step ahead forecast error variance
of the i-th element of xt accounted for the innovations in the j-th element of xt . Note that
this approach allows for contemporaneous correlations, the shocks across countries are not
orthogonal, and are invariant to variable ordering. Hence, GFEVDs need not sum to unity.
This section presents the GFEVDs of some selected scenarios of interest, focusing on
euro area real trade flows. Table A.7 shows the proportion of forecast error variance for the
top 12 determinants of the NEA real imports and the SEA real exports and imports, for the
first 12 quarters. Total sum indicates the sum of GFEVDs contributions across all countries.
The results point out that NEA real imports depend primarily on domestic variables such as
imports, exports and gross capital formation which account for the half variation during the
first year. The real exchange rate and non-export real output of NEA have a minor impact
while the oil price and SEA domestic variables hold a respectable contribution, especially
after 2 quarters. SEA real exports depend on domestic variables as well, where the contri-
butions of real imports and real exchange rate are important in explaining SEA real exports
variations. This confirms the import dependence of exports in the SEA and the significant
role of competitiveness. Interestingly, NEA real trade flows explain approximately 10% of
the SEA export variation after one year while the contribution of the non-export output of
NEA and oil price is similar. In addition, a major contributor of the SEA real imports (except
the variable itself) is the domestic gross capital formation followed by domestic real exports
and non-export real output. Despite the heterogeneity in the dispersion of contributions, we
also trace an important influence by the NEA real trade flows. The GFEVDs analysis for
the euro area real trade variables confirms the GIRFs outcome that there is a strong relation-
ship between NEA and SEA real trade flows. As expected, domestic variables are the main
determinants of the variation of the GFEVDs in each region.
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Table A.8 contains the GFEVDs results for the real imports of the two major global
importers, China and the USA. For the case of U.S. real imports, the contribution can be at-
tributed to domestic variables (imports, gross capital formation, exports and non-export real
output) as they account for the 57% of the total variation during the first year. With respect
to foreign variables, NEA, French and Swedish originated exports and real exchange rates
are also significant determinants of the U.S. import forecast error variance decomposition.
Moreover, Canadian real trade flows are among the top determinants of U.S. real imports
which is in align with the strong relationship between the two economies. The case of Chi-
nese real imports offers heterogeneous results, as we can not trace a particular geographical
pattern to the top determinants of the Chinese import forecast error variance decomposition.
A fact that stands out is the confirmation of the trade balance stationarity; Chinese exports
account for the 20% variation in the long-run import performance (after 3 years).
Table A.1: Data Sources
Country Real GDP Real GCF Real exports Real imports REER
Australia OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Austria OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Belgium OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Brazil WDI(3)∗ WDI(3)∗ WDI(3)∗ WDI(3)∗ IFS(4)
Canada OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
China WDI(3)∗ WDI(3)∗ WDI(3)∗ IFS(4)
Finland OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
France OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Germany OECD(2) WDI(3)∗/ OECD(1) OECD(2) OECD(2) IFS(4)
Greece OECD(2) WDI(3)∗/ OECD(1) OECD(2) OECD(2) IFS(4)
India WDI(3)∗ WDI(3)∗ WDI(3)∗ WDI(3)∗ OECD
Indonesia WDI(3)∗ WDI(3)∗ OECD(2)/WDI(3)∗ OECD(2)/WDI(3)∗ OECD
Ireland OECD(2) OECD(1)/WDI(3)∗ OECD(2) OECD(2) IFS(4)
Italy OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Japan OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Korea OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD
Mexico OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Netherlands OECD(1)) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
New Zealand OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Norway OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Portugal OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
South Africa OECD(2) OECD(1)∗ OECD(2) OECD(2) IFS(4)
Spain OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Sweden OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Switzerland OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Turkey OECD(2) OECD(1)∗ OECD(2) OECD(2) OECD
UK OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
USA OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Notes: (1) Economic Outlook No 101. (2) Quarterly National Accounts. (3)World Development Indi-
cators. (4) IMF, International Financial Statistics. (∗)Interpolated from annual data. REER indicates
real effective exchange rate.
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Table A.2: Unit Root Tests
Country
ny k ex im reer
Level D D2 Level D D2 Level D D2 Level D D2 Level D D2
Australia -2.62 -6.64 -13.23 -3.12 -7.48 -9.55 -1.72 -9.40 -10.55 -3.42 -6.26 -8.37 -2.12 -7.90 -10.02
Brazil -1.35 -2.29 -8.97 -1.28 -3.81 -10.18 -0.97 -5.87 -7.21 -0.67 -3.38 -9.73 -3.10 -5.23 -10.14
Canada -1.55 -5.60 -8.80 -3.11 -7.28 -10.21 -1.08 -4.29 -9.22 -1.23 -6.74 -9.18 -2.13 -6.75 -10.02
China -2.33 -3.08 -7.80 -0.28 -4.71 -8.30 -1.34 -5.93 -7.45 -0.25 -6.55 -8.72
France -1.06 -4.26 -14.04 -3.11 -5.09 -15.07 -1.42 -6.60 -8.49 -2.01 -6.07 -7.71 -2.76 -6.47 -9.50
Indonesia -1.96 -7.72 -10.50 -1.64 -4.74 -9.42 -3.46 -9.48 -10.48 -3.17 -8.01 -8.50 -1.88 -8.21 -10.70
India 0.53 -4.63 -10.94 -0.57 -4.22 -11.57 0.05 -3.86 -9.91 -0.97 -4.34 -9.74 -0.86 -5.59 -10.04
Ireland -2.09 -2.34 -6.28 -1.23 -5.45 -8.52 -1.81 -6.81 -8.41 -1.52 -5.88 -8.74 -1.60 -4.99 -9.52
Japan -0.05 -4.55 -9.34 -1.14 -6.29 -8.63 -3.97 -7.15 -8.91 -2.25 -7.32 -14.43 -1.53 -5.45 -8.20
Korea -0.59 -4.86 -9.09 -1.31 -7.68 -11.28 -0.86 -6.12 -9.59 -1.87 -8.23 -10.34 -3.19 -6.50 -9.60
Mexico -3.78 -7.96 -9.29 -2.32 -7.10 -8.49 -1.94 -9.81 -10.24 -2.18 -5.72 -8.75 -4.12 -6.01 -15.00
NEA 0.54 -5.27 -8.90 -2.82 -4.90 -8.23 -2.81 -6.36 -7.86 -2.18 -6.16 -8.34 -2.61 -6.45 -8.70
Norway -1.83 -11.32 -11.11 -2.64 -8.56 -10.43 -0.56 -11.77 -11.33 -2.14 -7.70 -10.72 -2.21 -8.56 -11.07
New Zealand -1.86 -6.30 -9.36 -3.30 -9.11 -10.39 -0.85 -9.99 -10.27 -4.18 -7.28 -8.03 -2.51 -4.97 -9.77
South Africa -1.71 -9.85 -12.25 -1.23 -3.83 -8.94 -1.56 -7.38 -13.35 -2.81 -7.08 -10.67 -4.19 -6.32 -7.95
SEA -1.81 -2.59 -8.29 -1.33 -5.99 -9.58 -1.72 -6.19 -7.44 -1.39 -5.75 -8.76 -2.46 -6.27 -9.73
Sweden -1.85 -6.44 -10.04 -2.70 -5.72 -9.90 -2.08 -6.47 -11.02 -3.14 -6.43 -8.40 -3.62 -6.35 -9.79
Switzerland -3.19 -8.28 -10.69 -3.12 -8.43 -13.05 -4.75 -7.43 -9.48 -4.76 -8.33 -10.80 -2.76 -6.71 -9.21
Turkey -2.49 -8.14 -9.07 -1.99 -4.36 -9.77 -0.05 -5.04 -8.38 -3.98 -7.94 -8.65 -1.37 -8.52 -10.21
UK -1.75 -6.38 -10.18 -2.69 -5.88 -9.81 -1.82 -9.56 -10.24 -1.33 -6.46 -10.06 -3.19 -7.19 -9.53
USA -1.66 -4.31 -7.77 -2.08 -6.54 -9.09 -1.63 -6.14 -9.44 -1.67 -5.24 -8.27 -2.34 -5.53 -9.29
Notes: Unit root tests based on weighted-symmetric ADF test (WS). Lag Length chosen based on AIC. Values in bold indicate rejection of the
null hypothesis. D and D2 indicate first and second differences of the levels respectively.
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Table A.3: Weak Exogeneity Test among NEA’s and SEA’s Variables
chosen lags p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1
South Euro Area Variables
nysouth ksouth exsouth imsouth reersouth
North Euro Area Model 4.90∗ 0.97 1.00 1.94 0.03
North Euro Area Variables
nynorth knorth exnorth imnorth reernorth
South Euro Area Model 0.36 5.81∗ 0.02 1.92 0.13
chosen lags p∗ = 2, q∗ = 1
South Euro Area Variables
nysouth ksouth exsouth imsouth reersouth
North Euro Area Model 1.12 4.35∗ 1.26 3.57 0.32
North Euro Area Variables
nynorth knorth exnorth imnorth reernorth
South Euro Area Model 0.02 7.29∗ 0.11 3.53 1.42
Notes: This table refers to weak exogeneity tests for the NEA’s variables on SEA’s region-
specific VECM model and vice-versa. Weak exogeneity test is based on the works of Jo-
hansen (1992) and Harbo et al. (1998). See subsection 4.3 for more information. ∗ denotes
rejection of the test’s null hypothesis.
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Table A.4: Weak Exogeneity Test of the Country Specific Foreign Variables and Oil Price
Country/Region
Foreign Variables
ny∗ k∗ reer∗ poil
USA F(1,134) 0.72 1.08 7.65*
North Europe F(1,134) 0.82 1.15 6.84* 2.81
South Europe F(1,134) 0.01 4.93* 0.36 2.72
UK F(1,134) 0.68 3.01 0.72 1.38
France F(1,134) 14.32* 1.85 0.41 0.57
China F(1,135) 8.58* 3.96* 0.37 1.76
Japan F(2,133) 0.09 2.78 0.53 1.59
Korea F(1,134) 0.70 0.33 0.69 2.08
Canada F(1,134) 7.84* 1.07 1.45 0.45
Australia F(1,134) 4.97* 1.03 0.00 0.00
Ireland F(1,134) 0.22 0.39 0.03 0.19
Sweden F(1,134) 0.43 0.50 0.01 1.42
Switzerland F(3,132) 0.46 0.68 0.42 4.15*
Norway F(1,134) 16.68* 1.98 2.00 1.42
New Zealand F(1,134) 0.06 18.90* 12.62* 0.15
Mexico F(2,133) 0.17 0.74 5.47* 0.31
Brazil F(3,132) 0.74 0.46 1.13 0.23
Indonesia F(1,134) 4.46* 0.06 1.31 4.51*
India F(1,134) 1.34 1.90 1.38 0.02
Turkey F(2,133) 0.33 0.29 5.18* 0.11
South Africa F(1,134) 1.05 2.21 0.13 0.06
Note: (*) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of the test.
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Table A.5: Average pair-wise cross section correlations
Country/Region
ny k ex im reer
Levels 1st Diff. Levels 1st Diff. Levels 1st Diff. Levels 1st Diff. Levels 1st Diff.
USA 0.83 0.08 0.85 0.14 0.98 0.25 0.97 0.27 -0.06 -0.14
North Europe -0.14 0.05 0.83 0.12 0.98 0.23 0.98 0.26 0.03 -0.01
South Europe 0.76 0.09 0.73 0.14 0.98 0.27 0.95 0.27 0.02 0.04
UK 0.83 0.06 0.83 0.05 0.99 0.17 0.98 0.19 -0.06 -0.03
France 0.83 0.09 0.87 0.14 0.98 0.30 0.98 0.28 0.15 0.04
China 0.81 0.00 0.98 0.14 0.97 0.08 0.17 -0.04
Japan 0.75 0.03 0.44 0.08 0.98 0.28 0.96 0.25 -0.25 -0.18
Korea 0.78 0.05 0.84 0.04 0.98 0.12 0.98 0.11 0.19 0.09
Canada 0.79 0.06 0.87 0.13 0.96 0.20 0.98 0.25 0.27 0.14
Sweden 0.78 0.09 0.84 0.15 0.98 0.24 0.98 0.29 0.15 0.06
Switzerland -0.41 0.03 0.79 0.01 0.96 0.11 0.97 0.09 -0.17 -0.06
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Table A.6: Structural Stability Tests, number of rejections of the null hypothesis
Structural Stability Tests
Domestic Variables (rejection %)
Numbers of rejections(%)
nyit kit exit imit reerit poil
PKsup 2(9.5) 1(5) 6(28.5) 2(9.5) 0(0) 0 11(10.4)
PKmsq 3(14.2) 1(5) 5(23.8) 1(4.8) 0(0) 0 10(9.5)
Nyblom 6(28.5) 7(35) 9(42.8) 6(28.5) 8(38) 1 37(35.2)
Robust-Nyblom 2(9.5) 4(20) 5(23.8) 5(23.8) 7(33) 1 24(22.8)
QLR 7(33) 9(45) 10(47.6) 13(61.9) 12(57.1) 1 52(49.5)
Robust-QLR 7(33) 6(30) 6(28.5) 3(14.2) 4(19) 0 26(24.7)
MW 7(33) 7(35) 9(42.8) 8(38) 10(47.6) 1 42(40)
Robust- MW 6(28.5) 5(25) 6(28.5) 4(19) 8(38) 0 29(27.6)
APW 9(42.8) 10(47.6) 9(42.8) 14(67) 12(57.1) 1 55(52.3)
Robust- APW 6(28.5) 5(25) 6(28.5) 4(19) 7(33) 0 28(27)
Note: All tests are conducted at the 5% significance level.
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Table A.7: GFEVD of the NEA and SEA real trade flows
Proportion of forecast error
variance
n-step quarters ahead
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
North Euro Area Real Imports (%)
North Euro Area im 83.23 73.53 70.67 69.60 69.09 68.84 68.75
North Euro Area ex 26.47 36.38 37.30 36.94 36.71 36.25 35.84
North Euro Area k 27.80 28.67 27.42 26.42 25.60 25.01 24.62
North Euro Area reer 7.78 7.93 8.41 8.63 8.83 8.87 8.87
Mexico im 6.72 6.12 6.20 6.25 6.33 6.42 6.47
Oil Price 3.26 6.06 6.42 6.63 6.64 6.58 6.51
North Euro Area ny 3.42 4.64 5.15 5.49 5.74 5.94 6.15
South Euro Area im 3.75 5.02 5.23 5.18 5.12 5.03 4.93
China ny 1.23 3.49 4.71 5.27 5.42 5.38 5.22
Japan ex 1.36 3.47 3.81 3.81 3.72 3.61 3.51
Total Sum 232 253.3 258. 258.7 258.6 257.9 257.2
South Euro Area Real Exports (%)
South Euro Area ex 80.23 72.94 68.87 66.29 63.98 61.93 60.18
South Euro Area im 23.28 22.48 23.15 23.86 24.40 24.91 25.45
South Euro Area rer 3.78 8.69 11.73 14.27 16.48 18.21 19.63
North Euro Area ex 9.41 13.21 13.10 12.40 11.42 10.44 9.52
North Euro Area im 6.67 10.42 11.46 11.71 11.51 11.29 11.02
France ex 9.47 10.07 9.87 9.67 9.40 9.11 8.79
Japan ex 8.46 10.26 10.09 9.63 9.12 8.60 8.14
North Euro Area rer 2.54 5.24 6.78 7.71 8.44 8.88 9.21
Canada im 6.22 6.96 7.01 6.96 6.94 6.85 6.79
North Euro Area ny 2.60 4.14 5.22 5.80 6.23 6.53 6.73
Total Sum 259.2 280.5 287.6 290.6 291.0 290.0 288.6
South Euro Area Real Imports (%)
South Euro Area im 78.18 70.10 67.37 66.16 65.62 65.36 65.10
South Euro Area k 31.01 36.58 37.47 37.96 38.32 38.44 38.51
South Euro Area ex 22.09 17.03 14.51 13.14 12.30 11.68 11.18
South Euro Area ny 1.61 11.50 14.49 15.80 16.55 16.99 17.34
North Euro Area im 9.06 10.12 9.91 9.70 9.52 9.39 9.27
North Euro Area ex 7.53 9.65 9.34 8.85 8.43 8.12 7.76
Sweden im 6.93 7.41 7.42 7.35 7.31 7.29 7.30
France ex 3.32 5.20 5.42 5.42 5.37 5.34 5.25
Japan ex 4.67 5.61 5.24 4.85 4.62 4.39 4.20
Canada im 4.77 4.81 4.55 4.43 4.37 4.36 4.28
Total Sum 268.6 288.7 287.5 285.0 283.3 281.4 279.4
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Table A.8: GFEVD of the USA and China Real Imports
Proportion of forecast error
variance
n-step quarters ahead
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
USA Real Imports (%)
USA im 85.81 74.45 70.04 67.14 64.62 62.43 60.54
USA k 32.08 43.79 44.04 43.73 43.17 42.30 41.33
USA ny 12.59 34.74 38.00 39.41 39.79 39.62 39.36
USA ex 12.24 17.82 17.85 17.66 17.29 16.77 16.28
France ex 6.25 7.27 7.59 7.79 7.95 7.91 7.87
North Euro Area rer 3.15 4.06 4.51 5.21 5.87 6.44 6.98
Canada im 5.16 3.76 3.67 3.66 3.64 3.62 3.59
Sweden ex 3.40 4.02 4.03 3.83 3.65 3.43 3.21
Sweden rer 2.06 3.80 4.09 3.99 3.77 3.57 3.34
North Euro Area ny 1.99 2.98 3.44 3.77 4.02 4.22 4.36
China ny 0.77 2.90 4.05 4.42 4.31 3.97 3.66
Canada ex 4.17 3.35 3.23 3.28 3.42 3.54 3.66
Total Sum 257.1 297.6 300.5 301.3 300.3 298.2 296.2
China Real Imports (%)
China im 95.58 89.70 84.62 80.77 77.93 75.81 74.15
China ex 22.69 30.38 36.77 41.68 45.14 47.57 49.29
China ny 5.23 6.27 7.15 8.10 9.22 10.07 10.91
Turkey k 7.74 6.17 5.61 5.33 5.12 5.01 4.94
Norway ny 5.28 5.48 5.41 5.29 5.16 5.05 4.96
Switzerland k 5.31 5.19 4.68 4.22 3.86 3.59 3.40
South Africa im 3.59 4.17 4.42 4.48 4.48 4.44 4.36
Brazil ex 3.44 3.81 4.09 4.23 4.31 4.32 4.32
South Africa ex 3.64 3.76 3.85 3.87 3.76 3.69 3.60
Canada ex 4.03 3.95 3.71 3.50 3.31 3.17 3.08
Korea ny 4.04 3.69 3.35 3.12 2.94 2.79 2.68
Switzerland ex 5.27 4.07 3.36 2.89 2.54 2.29 2.13
Total Sum 255.2 253.5 253.3 253.7 254.3 254.8 254.7
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Table A.9: Response % of Trade Balance in Countries of Interest based on GIRFs
Positive shock to NEA non-export input Response Significance
NEA SEA China France India Japan Sweden Switzerland UK USA Statistically Insignificant
Real domestic demand 1 year 0.35 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.30 0.05 -0.04 Statistically Significant (Bold)
3 years 0.33 0.07 0.19 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.28 0.04 -0.06
Exports 1 year -0.37 -0.28 -0.37 -0.14 0.00 -0.18 -0.39 -0.18 -0.03 -0.02
3 years -0.37 -0.30 -0.47 -0.15 0.04 -0.03 -0.40 -0.15 -0.04 0.02
Imports 1 year -0.07 0.16 0.04 -0.07 0.16 0.07 -0.09 0.13 0.02 -0.08
3 years -0.09 0.18 0.10 -0.08 0.05 0.22 -0.11 0.15 0.02 -0.11
Trade Balance (Ex-Im) 1 year -0.30 -0.28 -0.41 0.07 - -0.18 -0.30 - -0.03 0.06
3 years -0.28 -0.30 -0.58 0.08 - -0.03 -0.29 - -0.04 0.13
Positive shock to NEA real imports
NEA SEA China France India Japan Sweden Switzerland UK USA
Real domestic demand 1 year -0.05 0.03 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.10 -0.08 0.07
3 years 0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.08
Exports 1 year 0.63 0.38 0.10 0.37 0.03 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.09
3 years 0.57 0.34 -0.08 0.30 -0.04 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.05
Imports 1 year 0.81 0.40 -0.06 0.29 0.04 0.16 0.39 0.16 0.11 0.23
3 years 0.77 0.40 -0.04 0.21 -0.05 0.10 0.27 0.14 0.08 0.21
Trade Balance (Ex-Im) 1 year -0.17 -0.02 - 0.08 - 0.11 -0.09 0.27 0.15 -0.23
3 years -0.20 -0.06 - 0.09 - - -0.27 - 0.19 -0.21
Positive shock to SEA Real Imports
NEA SEA China France India Japan Sweden Switzerland UK USA
Real domestic demand 1 year -0.01 0.17 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
3 years 0.03 0.25 -0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.11 0.01 -0.01
Exports 1 year 0.31 0.53 0.56 0.27 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.22 0.19
3 years 0.26 0.58 0.43 0.24 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.01 0.18 0.17
Imports 1 year 0.23 1.05 0.39 0.23 0.14 0.04 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.10
3 years 0.20 1.10 0.48 0.18 0.12 -0.03 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.02
Trade Balance (Ex-Im) 1 year 0.08 -0.52 0.56 0.05 - 0.22 -0.05 -0.20 0.04 0.19
3 years 0.06 -0.52 - 0.06 - - -0.20 - 0.01 -
Negative shock to SEA Real Effective Exchange Rate
NEA SEA China France India Japan Sweden Switzerland UK USA
Real domestic demand 1 year -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.03
3 years -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.06
Exports 1 year 0.05 0.44 0.22 0.17 0.28 -0.09 0.32 0.00 0.09 -0.16
3 years 0.06 0.58 0.17 0.18 0.32 -0.17 0.37 -0.01 0.11 -0.19
Imports 1 year 0.04 -0.21 0.16 0.10 0.36 0.04 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.06
3 years 0.04 -0.15 0.20 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.16 -0.01 0.00 0.15
Trade Balance (Ex-Im) 1 year - 0.44 - 0.17 -0.08 - 0.32 - - -
3 years - 0.58 - 0.18 0.00 - 0.21 - - -
Note: Trade Balance was estimated after using only statistical significant shocks.
Figure A.1: Regional Current Account Balances as percent of GDP
Source: OECD, World Bank and authors’ calculations.
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Figure A.2: Bootstrap Means of Persistence Profiles
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